Washington and Lee University School of Law

Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons
Supreme Court Case Files

Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers

10-1972

Broadrick v. Oklahoma
Lewis F. Powell Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Broadrick v. Oklahoma. Supreme Court Case Files Collection. Box 9. Powell Papers. Lewis F. Powell Jr.
Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Virginia.

This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers at
Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme
Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

..

/~

---

jvv i~. C. )~

~· u-,____5(__ (~
~ ~.~~ ~.;~- ~~ :3/

9/6/72 ... -LAH

-f ~~~c

~.

s- ~

~~~

t~)

(L_:;f

~~ ~

~ _f1 )

~ c;f.
~ ~ c A- /!J- c: C-4-z.-R.__

--

~~~~~ · ~UHf H~ ~~~ ~ ~
.

~~_p-,- ~-L ~.

No. 71Nl639 OT 1972
Broadrick v. Oklahoma
Appeal from USDC WD Oklahoma (3-j eta Holloway,
Daugherty, Eubanks)
FIRST AMENDMENT--POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF CIVIL SERVANTS
Appellants are employees of the Oklahoma Corporation
Comm'n and are subject to the Stateus civil service

r------

law.

..___,

Under the civil service law employees are prohib"

ited from soliciting contributions for a political
organization, from becoming a member of a political
party, from running for public office, or from
taking part in any political campaign.

If a state

employee does any of the proscribed acts he will be
terminated from state employment.

Appellants parti-

cipated in the rewelection campaign of one of the Corp
Comm'n Commissioners.

They were charged by the Per-

sonnel Bd with violations of the statute.

They filed

suit in the USDC WD Oklahoma, claiming that the state
statute was unconstitutional because it impermissibly

..
interferred with the First Amendment political rights
of public employees.

A three"judge ct was c0nvened

and that ct ruled against appellants and ordered the
case dism'd.'

Appellants seek direct review in this

Court.
The lower ct opinion is crytic but it makes the
following conclusory points.

First~

the statute prohibits

only "partiean political activities" and does not
preclude employees from speaking publicly or privately
Second, avoiding the 1 ~anger of

on public issues.

having prommtions and discharges of civil servants
motivated by political ramifications rather than on
merit ' 1is a compelling justification for the narrow
intrusion into First Amendment rights. Third 9 United
Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) is
still good law and is controlling in this case (Mitchell
held that the Hatch Act prohibitions against partisan
political activity were constitutional).

Appellants

claim that the state law is not susceptible to the
"narrowing interpretation" given it by the ct.

They

also claim that the statute sweeps too broadly and is
not limited to justifiable state interests.

Finally 9 they

assert that Mitchell is not good law in light of
subsequent SC cases.··
RECOMMENDATION
In recent months there has been a great deal of
focusing on Mitchell and the prohibition against
political activity.
worthy of note.

Two cases from the lower cts are

The CAS recently (last September)

..

,..-3--

decided a case involving a Macon, Georgia ordinance
which prohibited local firemen from having bumper
stickers on their cars.

Judge Goldberg wrote a

lengthy and scholarly opinion in which he held the
Macon law unconstitutional.

He discussed Mitchell

at length and concluded that its basis had been
severely undermined in subsequent cases.

Mitchell

was a 4-3 Justice Reed opinion indicating that
prohibitions against partisan political activities
could be approved if supported by a "rational justification."

Subsequent cases have held that where 1st

Amendment interests are involved an incursive law will
be sustained only if it is supported by a "compelling
justification."

Cert was not sought in that case.

A second, more important case, has recently been
decided in the USDC DC.

A threewjudge ct split 2-1

in a decision holding the Hatch Act unconstitutional
and (from what I gather) holding that Mitchell is
no longer a viable precedent.

Judge Gesell wrote the

majority opinion and Judge MacKinnon dissented.

That

case was de~ded on -l!:lY 3?, and will, almost undoubtedly 11
be appealed to this Ct.

It is my judgment that we

should await that case, with an eye to noting probable
jurisdiction when it arises.

The question is an import•

ant one and there is no likelihood that the Ct will

I

wish to avoid the case.

case an

We should put this Oklahoma

thecEO~ for the time being.

Hopef~ ly,

the Ct can find a way around having to review this thing

on its merits.

There is a serious question about

..
.... 4......
the DC's "narrowing"
_ _ _..:::::.__interpretation.
_ _..:__ __
r-'~·~~---

The state law

seems explicitly to preclude public discussion of
political issues.

The DC opinion is not wtitten as

an opinion but is chopped up into numbered sentences

--..

under the titles "Findings of Fact" and "Conclusions
of Law."

It is devoid of analysis.

HOLD FOR DC CIRCUIT HATCH ACT CASE
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SUPPLEMENTAL MEMO RE RELISTING
No. 71-1639 OT 1972
Broadrick v, Oklahoma
Appeal from USDC WD Oklahoma

DISCUSS

This "Hatch Act" case was relisted to await the
appeal of the DC Hatch Act case.

I do not know the status

of the DC appeal but this case should surely await the
decision to appeal and eventual appeal in the DC case.
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William M. Broadrick et al.. On Appeal from the l'n1tc•d
Appellants,
States District Court for
v.
tht> Western District of
Oklahoma.
~tate of Oklahoma et al .
lJU11e - , 19731

MB.

Jewrrc~<:

WHin; ciPlivcrC'd the opinion of the Cotirt..

Section 818 of Oklahoma's M(•rit System of Person1wl
Administration Act, 74 Okla. Stat. Ann. ~ 801 et seq ..
rpstricts the political activities of the State's classifiPd
civil s0rvants in rnuch the sam<' manner that the Hatch
Act proscribes partisan political activities of federal <'Ill·
ployC'cs. Three employePs of the Oklahoma Corpo ration·
Commission who are subject to the proscriptions of ~ RUf
s<>ck to have two of its paragraphs declared unconstitutional on their face aiHI pnjoined because of assert(•d
vagu<'JH'SS and overbr0ad th . After a hearing, thr Di~
trict ( 'ourt \D2..held the section and denied relief. :~:3R F
Supp. 711. Wr note"cT"j)rohahle jurisdictio1;-of the ap[Wal. 4m) U. ~- 1058, so that appellants' claims could
be considPred together with thoRe of their federal eoun"
tC'rparts in U11ited States Civil Service Commissio11 \

.\'atio11al Associat'iou of Letter Carriers , AFL-CIO, ante .
p We a~ the .iudgnwJtt of thr District Court.
SC'ction 818 was enacted in l!l59 when the ~tate first
Pstahlif'hecl its M(•rit System of Personnel Administration .' Tlw secti011 servps roughly tlw same function as
Tlw ~('!'I ion I'l'ad~ ''~ follow~.
"I I I 1\To prrso11 111 the da~sifird "'' ' VH'P "hall lw appointrd to, or
cl(•motPcl 01 dism'""rd from '"'~· [H)' '' 1011 i11 t hP !'las:sified ::;rrvH'l', or
1
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tlw analogous provisions of th0 oth0r 49 States, 2 and
is patt0rned on ~ 9 (a) of the Hatch Act." Wjthout
question. a broad rang0 of political activjties and conin an.1· '''"·'· fa vor<'d or dt~erinunatl'd agatn~t II' II h t'<'~JWl'l to rmploynwnt in t ht• dn~~ifkd 1:iC'I'I'H'<' i>rrall:<<' of ht~ polttt<"al or relig1011~
opinton~ or aff'iliatton~. or h<•<·all:<r of racr. <·n·Pd. color or natwnal
origin or i>~· r<'a"on of an.1· ph~·"tral h:utdic·ap :<o ].)ltg a:< thr phycH!':d
handicap do<·~ nol prrvrnt or rPnd<'t' thP Pmplo.l'('<' lr:<:< ablr to do
t hr work for wht<"h lw I1:i Pmplo~·<·d
"I:! I Xo JlPI'"Oll ~hall II"<' or promi~<· to II~<', dm•<"l I~· or tttdm·<·tl~.
an.1· ofli!'i:tl f\llthoril.l' or infltt('llt'<', whl'lh<•r po:<"<'""<'cl or antictpat<·d.
to "reliT'<' or nttrntpt to H<'<'lll'<' for an~ · JH·r~oll an appotntml'nt or
:tdvanlng<' 111 appointnwn1 to a po,..t1ton 111 thr !'ia":<ifiPd :<<'I'I' IC<' . or
an mrn·a~<· 111 pay or other advantagt• 111 l'tllplo~ · nH·nt 111 :In~· :<ll<'il
po,..i1ton. for tlH· pmJhl:<r of infiii<'IH'tllg thr vol<' or poltlt!'al ac•twn ol
an~ · pN:<on, or for <·on,..tdrmtton; prol'ldc•d. hoii'!'I'N, th:11 l<'11N~
of nH tlltr~ · , n·<·ommrnda ttOn and rl'i'<•n•n<·<• b~ · p11 bite· <'Ill plo~·cr" of
p11 bl it· olli!'taJ ..., "hall not llE' <'Oil~tdcrrd oJ!iriHl all t hon1 ~ · or 111 flurncc•
tlnJr;o;,.. <'ltr'h 1<'11<'1' c·ontam" a thrral. tnlumdalton, ti'I'Pif'l'all1. dc•rog:ilor~ · or fal~t' mfonnation .
'·[:3_1 :\o pN:<on ~h:dl mnk<• an~· fal~t' ~1atc•nH'lll , ec•rt1fical<' . mark ,.
I'H llll!J:, or rrporl with rrga rd Io an~· tr~l, rrrt ifira I ton or appontl mrnl
made lllld<'r mt~· provt,..ion of tht:< ,\<'1 or ll1 :Illy manner rommtt nn.1·
fraud prr1·<·n1 mg t ht• tmpnrtwl rx<'<'ll1 1011 of t ht~ Al't and rui<o~ mad<•
hrrrundl'r.
"[41 :\ o c•mplo~ ·<•t • of tlw drpn rtltH·nt , <' XHlllllll'l', or o1 ht>t' JlN~ort
~hnll tltoft•at. dt'<'l'll'<'. or oh~trur1 an.1· p<·r,..on Ill ht,.. or ill'r nght to
<·xanunn 11011. rlil!:ihil t~ · . <'<'rltfir:ttwn. or appomt tn<'lll undl'r till" I: til',
or fnrni~h to an~ · prr,on an~ · ~Jil'C'ial or H<'<'T'<'I tnform:tlton !'t)!' tlw
]ntrpo,;<• of <·ffe<'tlll!J: thl' nghl" or pro,pt•<·t ,; of an~· pt'r"on ll'lth
t'<'"P<'<'I 1o rmplo~ · nH' lll 111 tlw cla"''tfi<•d "l'I'I'H'l'
"[;)[ :\o JWr:<on :<hnll. dtn•rtly or mdirrr11~ · . !J:IV<'. l'('lldt•r , p:1~ · .
ofl't•r. "oli!'tl. or a<'<'<']l1 an~· rnone~·. ~<·n · t<·r. or oth<•r l'alunhl<• r·on:<td!'l'a 1ton for or on a<·r·ount of an~· n ppom1 1lH'll1, propo,..<'d appomltnl'nl . promotiOll. or propo:<l'd promoltoll to. or an~ · :tdi'Hlll :lg<' Ill , n
post I iotl tn llw rln,..~ifiPd ~l'I'I ' IC'( '.
"[li[ :\o rmplO.I't'l' 111 the• <·Ja,..stfic•d :<<'I'I'H'l'. and llO Ill<'llllwr of th1 ·
l't•rsonn('l Board ,..lt :dl. dm·<· tl~ · or tlldtn•c·11~ ·. "oiH·tt. n·c·c·tl'<' , or Ill
:Ill~ lll:lllll('l' ))(> I'OllCt•rnPd Ill ,_ oJt!'t(lll!J: 01' 1'('('('1\'illg ;Ill,\' :l"·'('""llH'll1 ,
"'tll." l'l'lll1ton ot' <'OII1rthllltoll for an~ · polt1tl'al orgnnlz:tttoll . c·nndidnt·~
or otlll'r polliH·nl purpo~<·; and no ~tatt • ofli<·t·r or :<tnt<• <'lltplo.ll'('
lF oot11ul e l

beums
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duct are proscribed by thl' S<'ction. Paragraph six. 011P
of the eontcstc>d portions. provides that "In lo employl'<'
in tlw classified S<'rvice . . . shall. dirc>ctly or indir<'etly.
in t lw

tmrla~~tfi<'d ~!'fvi<"r ~hall ~oiH·tl

~llhH·ripl

or rr<"<'I\'(' an~· ~u('h a~:-w~~nwm.
ion or c•ontrilmt ton from an c·mplo~·pp 111 th<' dn~~tfic·d

ti('l'VI('l'.

'·I 'i I Ko l'tnplo~·l'<' in the <·ln~:-tfit·d ~<·n· tr<· .·dt:dl I><' a lll<'llliH•r of
any natiOnal. ~latr or loe:d c·omtnttl<'<' of a politte:d part~ · . or an
officPr or mrmlwr of :1 commttt<'<' of a partt~an political elub. or :1
candidntl' for nomination or PIPet ton to an~· patd pubiH· ofli<·c·. or
~hall take- pari 111 thr managPm<·lll or afl"air~ of an~ · politiC'al part~ ·
01' in ill!~ politi(':ti l'HllljlHign. l'Xl'l'pl to ('X<'rei~l' lti~ nght~ H~ :1 ('liiZl'n
privniPI~· to rxprrs~ hi~ opinion aud to cast hi~ voi<' .
'"IS] ["poll a ~howing of ~ubst ant in! Pvidc•nc·r h~ · t lw I'N~ontwl
l>in•ct or that an~ · ofTi<·<•r or <'Ill plo.\"<'<' 111 i lH• ~~at<' dns~ifiPd ~<·n· u·< · .
Ita:- knowinl(h· \'iolat('(l 1111~· of the• provt~toll~ of tin,., :-i<'<'llon . tlw
St a I<' PN~0111H'I Board ~hall not d\ tlw ofiicN or c·mplo,\'C'<' so l'hnrgc·cf
ancf tlw appointing nuthont~· 1111drr who~r jun~dH•ttoll tlw oflicN or
<' mplo~ · rr srrvr;;, If tlw offic·<·r or <'ntplo~· r<' ~o dP~trrs, t lw 81:\1 <'
PPrson11rl Board shall hold a puhlt<' lwarmg, or shall authol'l7.<' thr
Pt·r~onnrl Dirrctor to hold a public ]waring. and sui!Imt a tran~enpt
therrof. logrthrr with a rr<·otmnrndatton, to tlw Stnte l'<'rsounPI
Hoard. HPirvant wttnP~~r;:; shall I><· :dlowrd to lw pl'('~<'lll and tl'~t tfy
at sueh hearings If tlw officrr or rmployr<· shall h<· found guilt ,\· hy
the Stair Prr::~o1111rl Board of lh<· \'lolattoll of an~ · provtstOJl of tht~
Section , tlw Board ~hall dirr<'t till' appot11t111g authont~ · to dt~mi~~
~ueh officer or <•mplo)·<·<·; and till' appotllllltg authont.'· ~o dm•<·tl'd
tihall c·ompl)· ." H Okla. Stat. Ann.~ l'li' (19()5) (paragraph <'1111111<'1"a I ion addrd)
2
S<'<' ,\Ia . Cod<'. Ttt .">5. § :)J'i ( HJ.'ii'), :\la~b Stat. § :~~U5 . 1HO
(191)1), Anz B<·,·. Slat .\nn. § 11i- 1:l01 (HJ.56) , :\lrnt S~·~tl'lll Hrgulatton~ and :\1Pnt S~· ~t<'m Bd. l'rol'Pdun•:-< § 1;)11 (1!:l6f)): Ark
Rtal. Ann . § ~:3-119 (Hl47); C'al. fio,·t. Cod<·§§ 1!:l7:30- 19n5 (WP~I
l!:lH-1) : Colo l1<·,· Stat. Ann . ~ :!C\- .5- :31 (HHi:l), Cl\'11 8('1'vtcr
Comm 'n Hul<'~ a11d J1pgul:ttJOn>< , .\rt XJV, ~ 1 , Co11n Grn . Stat
Amt. §5-1 no (195S). Hrgulat 1011~ of t hr Ci\'11 Sc·rvH'<' Comm 'n Con<'Pl'llillg Emplo~·rr~ 111 tlw Stat<' C'la~stfi('(l 8<'1'\'H'< ' § 14-]:{ : :H Dc·l
Codr Ann . § llO (19.'):3) ; Fl:t. 8tat. .\11n . § 110.092 (197:)). (b
:\!Nit S~ · ,.,trm of Prrso11nrl Adm1111~tralion, Hulr;; a11d J1pgulalton:-;,
Hull' :3 , ,r:U01- :UOn; Hawa11 HP\' Stat. § m-1. 71Hll (19(il-) ,
lrlaho Cod<' §67- 5;{11 (197:)). Ill. Ann . Stat.<'. 2-1%. §:31'1 (Smtih-
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solicit, receive. or i11 any manner be concerned in soliciting or receiving any assPssment ... or contributwn
for any political organizatioll. candidacy or other political
purpose." Paragraph seven, the other challenged paragraph, provides that no such employee "shall be a member
of any national. state or local committee of a political .
party. or an officer or member of a committee or a partisan political club. or a candidate for nomination or electwn to any paid public offiee." That paragraph further
llurd H!H9): Ind. Ann. :::ltnt. ~ li!}-B·+l (19i0): Iowa Cod<• Anll .
19A.ll\ (19(i7): Kan , Stat. Ann.§ 75-:.?95:{ (J9(i~)) ; K~· . R<•v . t\tnt .
Ann. § 1~.:310 (HJ()9): La . Ctv. Codf' Ann., Art. 14, § 15 (i\) (W<·~t
HJ51): \1<'. H<·,·. :-;tat. Ann ., Tit . .'i, § li79 (1!:Hi4). ~lei. :'llf'rll :-1~·,-t<'nt
Hul<>" for c:rant-n1-AJ(I Ag;<'ll<'l<'" § 1)()2.2 : :VIa"::;. G<·n Law~ Ann
(' 515, §§ 1- 15. (' . i)li. §~ :{,5-:{(i (HJ5S) : \fil'h. Hub or l'm l 8<'1'\'H'I '
Conun'n § 7 (19(i.5): ':'limn Stat. Ann. § ..J.:Uh (1970) ; :\II~" · :\It•nt
S~·"t<'m Hult'"· l>f'pt. or l'ubllc Wrlfnn• , Art. XVI (191i.')): \lo. Ann .
Stat. § :~<i.l50 (191i~)): \lo11t. Ht'\'. C'O<IP" Ann. §§ 94-14:~9. 94-l..J...J.O ,
9-J.--1-J...J.'i, 9..J.--1..J.7H (19..J.2); :\Pb. H<•v. Stat , § ~1-1:315 (19ti8). i\'<'h:
.1oinl "'Irrit S~·~lrm Hf'l/:. for a \l!'l'it Sy~tf'm , Art. XVI (191i:3): N<'v '.
Rulr~ for Statr l'<'r"olln<'l Admilli~tration, Hulr~ XVI. XIII (l!:Jii:3) :
N.H. Hf'v. Stat. Ann. §§9S:11-i-9S:19 (19H8) ; N .•J. Stat. A11n.
§ 11:17-:2 (19(i0): :\. \l<•x. ~tilt. ,\IJll . §.5- ..J.--..J.:l (195:{) : :'\. Y. C'tv.
S<•t-v . § J07 (HJ7:{): :\. ( '. <:<·ll. :-;tilt.~§ Uli-1:{-U(i-1.1 (191)-J.) , Hub
:llHI Hq~. of:\ . Dnk. :\ll'rit ~~ ·.,tt'lll,. Art. X\'1: Oh10 H<'v. C'od<· Allll
~§ 1-J.:Ul, 1-J.:) ...J...J.. 1..J.:U5 , 1-J.:) ...J.ti (p . 1U54) : On· . Hf', .. Stat.§ :2(iO..J.:32
(Hl5:{) : l'a. :-ilat. Alln .. T1t. 71 . §7..J.1.!JO..J. (1\J(i:.!): H. I. c:rn
La\\'~ Alln. §§ :{li-..J.--51-:{ti-..J.-,'):) (191i9): ~. C. ;\Jprit ~~ · "tem Hub
:tnd Hq! .. ( 'i,·il 1kft · n~< · t 'olln1·li ..\rt. X I\'. ~ 1 : ::3. Da k. :\I Nit s~ ·~ t I'Ill
Hl'g ., Art. X\'1 (19(i:{). §1: Tl'llll. l'odr Ann. §1\-:)121 (1955) .
TPlln. Hnlr~ illld Hq!;. for . \dmtni ~tNlllg: th<· Civil SrrvH'I' A<·t § 2.:{
(19fi:{): Tf'x. I'Pnal C'od<• .\llll ...\rt . 19.')-197 (195:)): l'tah C'od<'
Ann . § fi/-J:~-1:{ (HJ.5:{): \ 't. Hnl<·~ and H<'g. for PN~onn<'l Admml~tration § :3.0:.!: \ 'a. Snpp. to HniP~ for tlw AdmtlltHtratton of tht•
\ 'a. I'Pr~OlllH'I At't Rnlt' l.'J.J..J. (,\). \ra~h . Ht·,· . C'oc!P Anll . § ..J.l- O!i- 250
(HHiS): W.Va. C'mlr Allll. § :.!9- li- 1\J (1971): W1~. Stat Anll § W.:W.
W~ · o. H<·,· . H11b and H<·g~ . Hnl<' XIII ( HJiiO)
::5 r . S. C § 7:l:.!..J. (ill . S<·t· g<·lwrall~ · l 'niterl.'itatcs ('1uli .'ieruu·e
('u111111i~.~IOII \ ' . .'Vutionol Assur·lllltoll of /,e/te1 · Currl('rs . A/l' {,-('/0 .
11111(' . p
~
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prulllhits ::;u<'h <'Inploypp:-; fro111 "tak[ing] part in the
m:lllHI!.<'IlH'IIt or affairs of any political party or in any
politi<'al campaign. <'xcept to exc•rcise his right as a citizt'n
priYat<·l~· tu t'XJ>r<'RS hi!' opinion and to cast his vote .''
.\:-; ;1 c·o1npli11H'11tary IWO!'Cription (not challenged in th1:-;
l:m:-;ttit) tlw nr!'t paragraph prohibits any person from
" i11 Hll.\' wa~· .. IJ(•illg' ''favored or diRcriminated againRt
with r<·sp<·ct to e1nployme11t in tlw <'iassified service be<·att'-'<' of hi::-: politi<'al .. . opinions or affiliatidns. " Rc,,..
spon:-;ihility for 1nai11tai11ing and enforcing ~EnS's prO·
-.:('l'iptioll:-i is V<'stt'd in the Stat<.' Per::-:onnel Board and
t h<' State P<·rRollll<'l Dirc<'tor. who i:- appointed by the
Board. \'iolatiu11 of ~ 811'1 results in diRmissal from emplo~' llH'IIt and possible c·riminal sanctions and limited
o.;tatt• <'lnpluynH' Jit i11Pligihil1ty
74 Okla Stat. An11 .
~~ 1'118 i:IIH! XHJ .
.\pp<'llaJit:-; do 11ot and ha\'t' not questioned Oklaholna's right to pla<'e P\'<'n-hanckd n•strictions on thf'
parti:::a11 politi<·al c·ondu<'t of ~:<tatE' employees. AppPllants frt'l'l~· <'OII<'<'dt' that ~ucil l'l'StrictiOil1'o serve valid and
illlportant t'tal<' illH'r('~t~. partieularly with reRpect to
attract i11!?: gn·atl'r lllltnbers of qualified people by insuri11g thc•i1 joh s<•<·urity . fn·<' from the vicissitudes of thE'
Plt·c·ti\'t· proc·p,·:-;. all(! by protecting them from ··political
<'.\tortio11 ... ' :-'e<· ['nited J>ublic Workers v. Mitchell,
:no l ' ~ . 7.i . !l!l 10:1 (1!)47) . Rather. ap)ellants maintail! that ho\\P\'<•r p<:•rtnis:-:ibl<'. even commenc a e. thP
goals of ~ ,"{JS lllH,\' be·. its la11guage is unC'onstitutionally
l'ilgliC' ;till! i!R prohihitiOIIS toO OI'Oa(~ ~l' SWePp:-fail ing 1<;- di;'tiiJguish ht•twc><'il conduct that m~y be pruscrilH·d and c·onduC't that 1nust bC' permitted . For thesf'
a11d otht·r n · a~o11~. app<'llants assert that the sixth and
l\r 11 f 111 1 \ i'i" !! an t - ~~
·· Ap]H·Il a nl- : d~o rlatm that § KlK vtolatp~ the Equal Protect!Oil
Cl :lliH ' of tlu· Fonrt<·t•ntlt .\mrndmrnt J,~ ;;mgling out rla~sified ~NV1Cl'
<' lllplo' ,.,., for rt ·~llwt 1011 ~ 011 ]l<lrtl~Hn pohtlC·al Pxpr<'::;swn while !eav-
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SC'\'('nth paragraphs of ~ ~lS arc' void 111 toto and cailllOt
br <'llforc<•d against th<'Ill or allYOll!' rise•."
\\'<' han' h<•ld today that tlw llat<'II .\!'t IS not IInJWnnissibly vague . .\'alional .lssociation of Leller Carriers, ante, p. - . We• hav<' littl<' doubt that ~ R18 iR
similarly not so vague that "Ill!'lt of <·ontillOtt llttcllig<'IH'<'
lllliSt IH'C!'Si'Hl'ily guel'i' at its IIH'Cillillg. " ('OIIII(Iil,lj \ '
Uenl'ml Construction ('o .. :.?(i!l {' . ~. :)S,). :301 ( 1\l:.?(i l
::-1<'<' Gra,IJ!Ifd \'. City of Hockfonl. 40~ l '. ~. 104. 10~ 114
(l!l72J; Collo11 , .. Kentur·ky. 407 l' . ~. l04 . 110 11i
( l\l72J; Ca111eron v . •\litcltell , :-3\10 l' ~-till. tilti (HHiR).
\Vhatev<'r otlwr probk1ns tlH'l'!' ar<-' " ·ith ~ H1H. it ir-; all
but fri\'(Jlous to suggrst that til<' "<'ctio11 fails to giw
ackquat<' warlli11gs of ,,·hat H<'t iviti(•s 1t proi"('ribrr-; or
fail!' to s<'t out "cxpli<'it stalHiards'' for those who must
apply it. Orayned , .. City of Hockford. supra. at lOR
111 thr plailtf:'St la11guage. it prohibits an~· statr !'la1:1sifif'd
<'mploy<'f' frolll being "an officer or 111ember" of a "par.:
tisan political rlub'' or a caildidatf' for "a11y paid public
offire.'' lt forbids tlw l"olicitation of rolltributions "for
any political or11:anization. eandidaey or otlwr politieal
)Jili')JOSC' .. a11<l th<-' taki11g part "in thE' management or
affairs of any politi<·al party or 111 Uil:V politi<·al <'arnpuigii.
\Vonb iiH'vitably <·ontain g<'rins of un<'ertalllty .
hut ~ 81~ is at kal't frf'e of ~twh arnbiguit,v-ladrn tf'rms
111~ llll<'I :I•~ Ifit ·d JH'l'~O IIIt<'l fn·1· fro111 ~tll·h n ·~ lrll'llon.-.

Tl1t· t·oJII!'ll-

1ioll I ~ ~II IIH'Wil:tl odd Ill I ilr !'Otll('';i of : IJIJIP)lanl~ · Jll'lll!' IJl:l) (•);IIIII .
11'1111'1! 1~ 1ila1 ~

,..;1.-..

rc· : lciH·~ loo far I':IIIH·r I han 1101 f:1r !'llollg;h

:1 11 ,1' ('1'1'111. IIH· i<ogJ~I:IIIII'(' lllll~l
llilH·il of It~ ('lllJl]O~'IIH'lll

In

ilHI '(' ~(Jlll(' 11'('11';1,1' Ill dl'i('l'lllllllllg

JlO'IIIOll ~ 1'('11'111'(' rc·~II'II'ItOII~ 1111 Jl:ll'lt~ :l ll

polill<':tl :ll'lll'tiH·~ and 11·hieh 111:1 .1' ht•ldl lllln'glli:ll!'d.

:-;,., . .l!tr!ou·w r
llf!l' ylallll. :wo I ' :-; 4:20 ( 191il) . ..r .'iuwrr11ta11 1· /)ouoa/1. ( :-; ( 19/:i). c\JHI :1 :-;1;11!' (';Ill h :1 rdl~ · ill' L11l111'd for :lll!'lllJlllllg

Ill illllll 1h1• pm<ill<lll ~ IIJlOII 1\hll'h ~tH·h l'C'~Il't!'IIOII~ :11'(' p);I('C'd
'· Onl .1· 1hr .• lxth :11HI ~l'l'!'lllil parag;r:1ph.• of
1111, 1:111,11 11

fl< •n •Jnafl< 'l'. rd<·n·nc·,·~ lo ~

.-..1.-.

§ ,'oJS

:I n' :1t ~~~II(' 111

•ho11 ld hr lllldl'l'~ lood

111 IH • ]llllltl'd lo lho,..c · par:tgr:1ph~. 1111k ~~ 11·c· tnc[H·aiP to tlw c·onlran· ..
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as "gangster," LanzeUa v. i\'ew Jersey, 30() C :-1. 4.51
( 1939), "common 11ight walkers ... Papachrislrru \·. City
of Jacksonville, 405 P. S. 156 (1972), or "annoying'' COil•
duct, Coates \'. Cincinnati, 402 e. S. 611 (1971 ). which
in the past have been held to turn statutes. particularly
penal statutes. i11tO traps for thC' unwary or for those
UIIlucky enough to guess wroiigly .: See United State&

v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81 ( 1021); Winters \',
.\'ew York, 333 U. S ..507 ( Hl48); Baggett v. Bullitt,
377 C. S. 360 ( 1964); Palmer" · City of E1.tclid. 402 l'. ~ .
544 ( 1971). MorC'over. even if the outcrnloRt bound~
ariPs of ~ 818 may be imprecise. any such uncertainty
has little relPvance here. where appellants' conduct falls
squarely withi11 the "hard core·· of the statutp's pro ~
scriptions and appellants concede' as much. ' :-lee DomlmJtvski v. Pfister, 380 (T . S . 479. 4!H- 4D2 ( Hl65); [lnited
Y. Xational Dai·ry Products Corp., 372 r
S. 29
(1963); Williams\' . Uwited States, 341 U. S. 87 (1951) ;
Robinson \'. United States, 324 U . S. 282. 286 ( 1945) :
l ' nited Stales \'. Wurzbach, 280 U . S. 306 (1!)30) .

Stales

Shortly before appellants commenced their action i11
th<' District Court , they were charged by the ~tat<' Personnel Board with pat<'nt violations of ~ RlH ." Aecord 1 lt i~ .-igmfi1·nnl in 1ht~ rr~pr1·1 to noll' lhnt § Rll' dor~ no1 cr<':t1r
'·regnlalon· mazt·" wlwn' l·hoHt' ttnrrrtnin mny brl'omn hopdeHsly
loHt , RPt' Kl'!l-'iliOII ,. Board of lle~/CIIts. :1H5 U 8, 5~9 , t\04 (1961)
Hatlwr. tlw 8tn1L• Prr.-;otmel Board 1~ :t\'tlllnbiP to ruJp 111 ndntnt·t·
on t h<' pt·rmt.-~ thilll .r of p:1rt H'tdnr eondul't undC'I' thr rxplir1l :; tattd:lt'(b :;rt ou1 111 and umltor §I'll'> . S!'P Hrf' . 2:11
Scr Na.tioual A~.~o 
n atwn of Ll'ti er Carrwrs. ant<'. at - .
' Tr of Oral .\rg., ~k---Hl
·• Tlw lh.: tril't Comt unttall~ - n·qtll'~ted th<' partJ<'~ to brid the
<pt<'H iton ll'hrthN appdhnl" wc•rc' rrqttm•d to t·ompl<•tr tlw Ho:trd'H
JH'O< '<·Pdnlg" pnor to lmnglllg thl'ir :tl'tlon ttndrr 4:2 l' S C . § l9k:3
The Bonrd. hO\\'l'I'C'I', on :IJliH'II:Inl,; ' nppltrntJOII . ordt·rPd tiH pro<·r·<·d .Jllf!:H ,.:ta.n•d prtHiing; :td.itJdJC'ntton of the fc•drr:tl I'Oll~tJ1Ution:tl qlt(',.:WhPn :1ch·1kt'd of I hr Board '" d<·<·t:;Jon ,
1io.ll.' m 1iw DiHI rict ( 'nur1
:md m 1h1· ah:;PIJI'I' of a11~ · oh.wrtJOII>' from appellrrk, thr ])j,.q net

:1
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jng to the Board's chargeR. appl'llants actively participat<>d i11 the H)70 re-ekctio11 campaign of a Corporation
('ommissioner. appl'llants· superior. All three allegedly
asked other Corporation Commission employc0s ( individually and in groups) to do campaign work or to give
rcf<'rrals to perso11S vvho tuight h<'lp in the compaign ..
Most of these n•quPsts wer<' madP at district offices of
the Co1mn ission ·~ Oi 1 ttiHI Gas CoiJservation Division .
T\\O of the appeliants \·VCre charged with soliciting money
for the campaig11 from ( 'ommission en1ployees and one
was also charged with reeeivinp; and distributing campaign posters in bulk. In the context of this typC' of
obviously covered conduct. the statement of Mr. Justice·
Holmes is particularly ap])]'Ol1riat<' . "if there is any
difficulty ... it will be time enough to consider it when
rais('d by sonwo1w whom it concems.'' United States·
v. Wurzbach, supra, :280 P . ::-l., at 3~Hl .
Appellants assert that ~ IU8 has been eonstru<'d as
applying to such allegedly protected political expression
as the wearing of political buttons or the displaying
of bumper stickers.'" But appelHmt.s did not engage in
any such activity. They ar<' ~~ with activelyr ngag-illg i~)artisan politieal activities- including the solieitation of tnoney- among th<~ir eo-workers for the bellefit of their superior. Appellants eo1wede. as they must
in light of Letter Car1"iers. ante, that ~ 818 would be constitutional as applied to this type of conduet." Tlwy
nevertheless 1naintain that the statute' is overbroad and
Comt ]ll'o<·<•edrd, On tIn~ n·<·ord, WP nC('U nut rott,ld<•r wit('t lwr
:tppPIJants would lin,·p b('('ll rrqutt'('(l to proc<•Pd to henrin~ lwforc·
tlw Roard prior to pm,'ilttng tlwir § 198:) artiun . ('1', Gib.w11 v
Bel'ryhi/1,- ll . S. - , (1\l/:)): Hart and Weehsler, TIH• F<•<lrral
( 'omt' nnd Thr Fedrral 1:-l~ · ~t<•m. 9~:)-9~5 (2cl Pd. 197>!)
1
S<·<· \1Prit
" Th(• Stair l'<•rsoutwl Bo:trd Ita~ ~o intrrprriPd § ~l.S .
s~ · :<tPm of PPr~onnd Admtlll~ll':IIJOn Hulr.- ~ Hi41 : til<' Ro:ml '~ o!l1C'ml
('irntla r, RrC'. :z:ri
1
' Tr. of Oral .\rg, -!1-> -4~' -·
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purports to n·aeh pro1<•ctPd . !lf' wcll as tlllprot<•<·t<•d <'Oilduet . a11ct lllllf't thPrdor<• b<> ~trif'k<'ll dom1 011 its fa<·<·
and lwld to hP IIH'H1><1bk of allY <·o ns1 itutio11al appfication. \Ve do 110t lwli<'\'<' that thc ov<•rbrcadth doctrill<'
tnay ap propriai<"ly IH' invokcd in this lllallllN hcn'.
Emlwdd<•cl i11 tlw traditiot1al rul<·~ govemi11g ronstitutiotlal ncljudicatiotl is tlw pnneiple that a prrso11 to
whom a statute lllH.V c•ullstitutionall.v bc applicd "·ill
110t IH· heard to challrllg<· that statut<' 011 the grou11d that
it ~Y . c·oJl<'<·ivahly ~ appli<•d tJJH·otlstTtutu)Jla11~· to
1>ther~ . i11 otlwr situations 11ot be fun• the C''6Tirt.... . ee.
~~ . . lustin \'. The Aldermen. 7 \\'all . (i\l4. 6D8 (i90
(·1X()8): .<..:.uwruisors ' . 8tanll'.IJ. lOt) l '. :-\. :~05. all - :H.C)
~ iXkl) ; Hatch \'. Reardon. 204 l' . :-1. 1.)2. 1()0 Hil ( 1D07) ,
razoo c\· .\!iss. I'alley H ' Jackson I 'inyear ('o .. :22()
l ·. ::-:. . :?17. :?l!J- 220 IHH2); ('nited States, .. Wurzbach.
2XO C. :-1 . :3!Hi. :mo (10:30): ('r,.,nichn.el ' Southern Coal
& Coke Co .. :~01 t '. S. 4~fi ( 19:n); l'nitPd 8tn.les '
Haine.<>. :)():2 1' . S. 17 ( HJoO) . A closely related princ1pk
is that ron~titutional right~ ar<' pcn;onal and may not
I><' a~~l'rted ,·icariou sly . ~<'f' Me Go 1na 11 \' . Maryland , :366
r. ~ . 420. 4:29- 4:30 (19fHJ . Thf'l'<' prinriplcs rf'st 011
mon· t ha11 tlw fu~sin<'Sf' of .iudgl'!<. They rcflf'ct tlw ~ ~
con\'ietion that under our <'OI1stitutio11al syste1n eourt.s
::~,n• 110! roving <'OIIIlllissions assignPd to pass .iudgnwnt
011 til<• \'rtlidity of tlw :\atio11's laws. See }' o·ullyer '
Harris. 401 l'. :-1 37 ..1:2 ( Hl71 l ( 'om:titutional JlHigIJWnt:-. a:- ( 'hid Ju!<ticP Mnr:-:;hall r<'eognized. an· JliSllfi<'d only out of tlw IIP<'PI-'sity of adjudicating rights 111
p::trti<·ular <'H~'<'S hPt\\'C'<'n tlw litigHnt~ brought before tilt'

l

(\nut

"So d a lav,: h1• in oppol'liLioll to tlw ronstJtution :
d' both tlw law and thP <'OIIl'titution apply to a
particular c·a~<·. so that tlw c·owt lllU::>t eithpr <i<'·
rirk that c·a:-,p conformably to tlw Ia\\·. disregarding
riH· c·onstit ution. o1· co11fonnahly to thf' eoustitutio11
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rlii"rc•garding the law. the eourt tnust determine which
of these conflicting rules !!:Overns the case. This is
of the very esset1ee• of judieial duty." Marbury \' .
Mndiso'll, 1 Cranch 1a7. 177 (1803) .
In the past, the Court has recognized some IImitPd
c•xc<>ptions to these principh•s. but only because of thP
most "weighty countc•rvailing policies." (' nited 8lates
\'. Raines, supra, 3():l l". :-1 .. at '22-~3.'" On<> such e>.ceptwn is where individuals 110t parties to a parttcular
slllt Btand to lose by its outcotne and yet have• 110 effective>
ave'nue of preserving thc•ir rtl!:hts themselves. ~ee E1.Se ll 8tadt v. Baird, 405 l". :-1. 43H. 444-44() ( Hl72) ; .YAA Cf-1
v. . llabama, 357 l' . :-;_ 44\J ( 1958) . Anotlwr exception
has been carved out 111 the• ar<>a of the First Amendment .
It has long been rpcogn.ized that tlw First AmendlllPilt ueeds breathing space and that statutes attempttng
to restrict or burdC'n tlw e•xel'lcse of First Ame•ndment
rights must be narrowly drawn and repre~wnt a cotlSJdt>recl
legislative judgment that a parttcular rnod<' of expression
has to give way to otlwr con1pelling tlePds of socic·ty
Her11don v. Loll'ry , :~01 C. :-;_ 253. :Z58 ( 1937); 8helto11
\'. Tucker, 364 C. :-1. 47\J. 488 ( 1060 J; Gray ned v. City
of Hockford, supra, 40X r . :-1 .. at 116- 117. As a corollary.
tlw ('ourt has altc'rPd its traditional rules of standing
to pC'rtllit- in the First AmC'ndment area-"attacks 011
ovc•rl y broad statutPs " ·ith no requin•JtH.'nt that the IWrsotl tnaking tlH• attack dc•tnotlstratP that his ow11 conduct eoulcl not lw n•gt!latecl by a statute drawn w1th
tlH· n•quisite SJW<'ifieity." /)ull~iJrou,ski v Pfister. 3HO
l'. :-1 . 47!J. 4~6 ( 1!lo5J. Litigant~. thcrefon'. are I>C'rmittPd
to challpnge a statute 110t hpeause thC'ir ow11 rights of
' " ~<'<' gt·rH·r:dl~·. Hal'l and Vi't·('hsl('l' , ~upra. at 11'+-:21-L tlPdl(•r.
:-ltandrng to .\,<,.;Prt C'on~trtutlonal .Ju" Tntn 111 thr Supn•nw ('ourt ,
i 1 Yal<' L .J 5!!!1 ( 191"\:!) : ~ol<'. Th<• Flr~t Anwndnwnl Ovrrlm·adt h
Dot·tl'lnt• . s:l Uan·, L HP\", q..J (HI7 01 ,
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fr(•<• expn•ssio11 an• violated, but beeause of a judiciai
prPdiction or assUinption that the statute's very existence may cause oth<'rs not before the court to refra!n
from constituti<mally proteet<·d spe<~ch or expression .
. :-luch claims of facial ov<•rbreadth have been enter.t ained in cas<•s itlv~ut<~s which. by their terms,
R<:ek to regul~tP ~ "oply SJ>ok<• tt word s.,. Gooding v. Wil-son. 401) U. :-1. 51i-\. 52() ( 197:2). :-1<'<' CoJ,en v. California,

r. :-;,

40:3
l;) 11971); 8treet \ . .\'ew )'ork, 394 U.S. 576
( Hl6~J); Hrandenbur!J v. Uln'o, :105 r. S. 444 (196.9 );
Clwpl·insk:y \ . .\ .eu• Ha111psln:rc. 315 C. S. 568 (1942) .
I 11 suclt cas<'S. it has been the judgnwnt of this Court
that thP possible harm to sociPty i11 permitting some
Uitprotected spPech to go unpunished is far outweighed
by the possibility that protected spet>ch of others may be
muted and JWrceived gri<•vatlC<'S left to fester because of
the possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statuteb .
Overb. readth attacks have also bee. ll allowed where the ~
('ourt thought rights of association were ensnared in
statutes which . by their broad swe<~p. might result in
burdening innocent associations. See Keyshian v. Board
of R egents, :18.) 1'. ~- ;)R$l ( HHi7); U nded States v. Robel .
:1Rtl U. :-1. 25R (1967); .-lptheker v. Secretary of State .
:i7R C :-; , 000 ( 1964 J; Shelton v. Tuck er, supra. Fac·ial

overbreadth claims have also been consistently e11 L<·r- ~~
taitwd when• statutes. by their terms. purport to r<'!!;ll- !
late the time. place and manner of expressive or eotnlllUilicative conduct, see Gra:yned v. City of Rockfnl'd.

408 F. S. 104, 114- 121 ( 1972) ; Cameron v . .! oli nson .
:3!10 P . S. 611. 617- 619 (1968); Zwickler v. Kootn . 3X!l
( ' :-; _ 241.:249- 250 (1967l; Thornhill v. Alabnma. :no
tT :-1 . R8 (1940). and where such conduct ha:-: r<·quir<'d
official approval under Ia ws that delegated stat1dardh•s:-:
rli sc r<'tionary pom•r to local functionari es. res ulting 111
virtually um·evi<'wablP prior restraittts 011 First .\tttt'IHIment rights :-ieP 8huttlesu>orth \' BiTining/,run , :~\14

IIIII.,..
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P . S. 147 (l!:lf\9); C'o.r , .. Louisimw, 3n) U. ~. 5:36. 5.)3
558 ( 1D65); Kuuz " · Xew rork, 340 P. ~ . 2~JO ( 1051) ,
Lovell , .. Griffin, 303 r. ~. 444 (1938) .
Tlw consequrnce of our departure fro111 traditional
rulrs of standing in th<' First Amendment arras is that
any Pnforcement of a statutP thus placed at if-'Sll<' 1::-,
totally forbidden until and u11less a limiting <'O ilStructiUII
or partial Invalidation so 11arrows It as to n'll10I'<' th<··
seeming thrrat or dPterr<'IW<' to constJtutio11ally protectrd exprPssiOil. Applicatio11 of the oV<'rbn·adth do<'trinP in this mailller is. Inanif<'stly. strong medicllll' . It
has brt•n t>mployt'd by tlw ( 'ourt spanngly a11d o11ly a:-;
a last resort. Facial overlm·adth has not lw<>ll lllVOk<'d
11·hen a limitlllg construction has been or could lw plact>d
on tlw challenged statute. ~er Dombrowski 1 . Pfister .
supra, 380 l ' . ~ .. at 4!H; Co:r , .. .\'ew fla111pshire, 312
F. S. 56!J ( 1941); United Slates v. Thirty-Seven f>fwto r;raphs, 402 U. S. 363 ( 1971) ~ cf. Breard v. Ale.mndrw..
341 U. S. 622 ( 1951 ). Equally important. ov<'rur<'adth
claims. if rntrrtained at all. have been curtailPd wlwn
mvoked against ordinary cnmlllal laws that an' sought
to lw appli<'d to protrcteu eoncluct. ln CaultN'll 1 . ('ou
neclicul, 310 C. S. 2~)fj ( 1940) . Jesse Cantwt>ll. a J<·hovah ·s
\Y itn<'ss. was COil \'Ieted of colllmon Ia \\' br<"ach uf tlH•
]WaC'P for playillg 3 phonograph rc•conl attacking the
Catholic Church bdor<' two Catholic Ill<'ll on a :'\<'\\
Ha.v<'n strrct. The Court reversed Calltw<'ll's convict1on \
but only 011 tlw ground that his conduct. "(•unsicl<'r<'d 111
1igh t of th<' constitu tiona] guarantees... could not b<·
puni~lwd under "the common law off<'lli"<' 111 qupstion ."
/d .. at 311 ( footnot<' omittrd ). Th<' Court did not hold
that th e offl'llSf' ''known as breach of th<· [Wace " must
fall w tolo becausP It was capablr of sonH' unconstJtutional applications. and. 111 fact. tlw Court ~er ming]y
envisioned its continued use against "a great variety ol
conduct d<'stroying or mf'nacing pub!Jc ordrr and tra11 -.
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t]uilty.' ' ld. , at 308. SeP International Brother/wad of
Tea111sters, Lowl 69.5 ,.. \'out, :104 l'. S. 284 ( 1057),
Oar11er , .. Lou?siana, :3ti8 C S. 157. 20:2- 203, 205 ( 19()1)
(Harlan ..J.. concurring). Similarly. in revi<'\\·ing til('
statutory breach of the peace convictio11s invo]v('d i11
Edu•ards , .. South Carolina, :)72 lT. S. 2:29 (10('\:)). aud
Co.r \'. Louisiana. 37D t'. S. 536. 544-.5;)2 (1!J65). the
Cot1rt eonsickred in <ktail the Stat('·s evidenc<' and . i1i
t'aeh case ('OIJCluded that tlH' eonduct at iss ue could q(>t
be pu11ishcd under 11 breach of the 1wace statute. 011
that basis. the eOilvictiollS \·V t'r<' reversed.' ' Additio11ally ,
i>vt>rbrPadth scrntiny has generally lwcn somewhat less
rigid i11 the context of statutes regulating conduct in thf!
shadow of the First Ame11dme11t, but doing so in a lll'lltral. uoncPnsorial manuer. S0e Cnited Stntes ' C10 .
:)35 1' . 1'1. 106 ( l\J48); l'111.ted States v. Harriss, :~47 l '. S.
612 ( 19.54); R ed Lio11 Brondwsting ('o. , .. FCC, :3~)5 ( 1 • ,..; ,
;357 ( 106\l); cf. Vickerinr; \' . Board of Education, 301
U.S. 563. 565 11 . 1 ( 1968); Eastern R . Conference"· .\ 'oerr
Motor Frei{;ht, Inc., 365 l '. S. ( Hl!i1 J
It remains a ''nwttPr of 110 little· difficulty " to d<'tf'r- }
mine wht>n a Jaw may properly lw held void on its faee
and ,\'lwn "s ueh summary aetion ·· i:-; i11appropriat,e,
Coa.{es v. ('inc in 11ati. supra. at 617 (separate opinion of
Blade. .J. ). But the• plain import of 011r cases is. at the
Vf' I'Y least . that facial overbreadth ad,iudieati011 II'; a11 ex·ception to our traditional rtil<>s of praeLit<' and that tts
'" 1n hot h li'rlu·orrl8 and ( 'u.r f . at tlw wr~ · <'IKI of t liP dl~l'tl ~~iu n~ .
thr Court abo notPd that tlw ~tat 11tr ~ wonk! b1• l':tCiidly unron ~ tlttl 1ional for o\'t•rbnwlth . tlr<· :{7:.? l l. S .. Ht :2:li' : :)7\:) l 1 S., at 551
552 ln ('u.r I . tiw ('ourt termPd thl~ dt~('ll~~~on nn "adchtlollal
rea~OII .. for 1t' I'P\'Pr~al. :)'iH l' S. at 55:2
ThiN' "a ddi1JOI1:il
holdJliQ> w<·n· lllll11't'<'~~nr.v to I he di~J!O~I1Jol1' of till' <·a~<·~, ~o tlltlch
~o

thnt onl\· ol1<' \l<·nil>l'r of t!JJ, Co ttrt rplwd 1111 ( 'u.r·~ "a dclit io nal ''
holding in /Jruu ·11 \'. l-uuisw11a. :li':; 1· :-..; 1:)1 (1\)(i(i), wh1rh Jli\'OI\'t•cl
ro nvil'l'lon' und<·r ilw v•·n· .-•anw hrl'al'h of tiw p•·a<'l' ~tnt tit< ' t:i<'<'
£r/ ., ;(t 14:)- [f)() ( BHJ.: N NA 0,:: , ,J , <'()IIGilJ'J11J!l:) o
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functio ll. a limJt<>d Oil<' at the outs<•t. att<•nuaw~ a~ tiH·
hrhaYior tlw ~tat<' is forbidd<•n to sanction mov<'s fnHn
"pun• ~ .. to\\"ards eondtJct and that conduct- PvCil if
<'X]H'<'SI"ivC'-falls \Yithin th<· S('(J ]W of otlwrwist' va iJd
rrimi na l Ia ,,·s that rc>fiert legi tunat<' !'>tat<' intt•r<·stf: 111
maintaini11g <·oJll]H'<'IH'ItSiV<' colttrolf: over hanuful. roll ·
i'itJtutioJwlly unprott•ct<'d <'Oitduct .\!though i"Uch lam.. .
Jf' too broadly ,,·orrkd . lltay dPtr>r prot<'<'t<'cl i'i]l<'<'<'h t <'
som<· unkii0\\.11 <'Xt<'nt. tlt<'r<· c·oJll<'s a point ,,·hpn• tl1at
l'f"l'<•et at IH'st a pn·dictJOJl <·aJtiiOt . w1tl1 c·olltid<•JH'<'
.lllstify i1tvalidating a statui<· 011 it~ fa<·c· a11d so pro
hibi ti ng a ~tat(' front c•Jlforclllg tlw statu t<• against con ~
duct that il' acllnitt<•clly within 1ts powc>r to pror::crilw
('f .1/denl/(l/1 ,. r·111·/ed Slales . :3D4 l". ~ Ui.) . 174 17.)
( H)()!l ). To put tiH· Jnatt<•r anoth<'r way. partJCtilarly
\\'h<·n· <:Otlduet and not m<•n·ly spee<·h IS lltvolvt•d. ,,.p.
bc·lievP that tlw overbreadth of a statut<• must nut only
lw rc·al. but substantial as \H•Il. JUdged in n•latJOil to tlw
statute 's plai1tly legitJJnat<• 13W<'<'Jl. It 1s our VH'\\' that
~ ~IX is not substantially overbroad at HI that \\'haL<'vt•J ·
ov<•rhreadth 1nay exist should I)(' cur<'d through cas<'-hy
eas<' analysif:' of the fac·t :-;ltuations to \\hich 1ts saJJ<'t!Oil".
Hsl'<'rtPclly . Inay not IH' appiH•d
l ' 1tlikc· orc!Inary br<'a<:h of th<· ]H'at<> statut<•s ur otht•J
broad r('gulatory acts. ~ I:H~ is din•et<'d. by ltl' tPnns. at
politiC'al ('XI))'<'f.:sion \\'h]('h if <'ngag<·d 111 by pnvat(• ]H'rsolts \\'OUld phunly b<' protr>ct<•d by tlw First a1HI Four
ll'<'nth AnH•JJ(]Ilwnts. But at tlw sallH' tJlllP, ~ ~18 tl'
11ot a <'<' lt t:~orial statut<'. dir<·<'tPd at parti<·ular group:- or
VIC'\\ pmnts. ('f. Key:>liian ,. Boord of Heyen/8, supra .
Tlw statut<'. rather. speks to n'gulat<• politi<·al a<'tivJty f/
111 an <'\'<'11-hall<kd and IH•utral lllallllPr . .\s 1ndieated . ~ 1
such ::;tatutt•s have 111 tlH• past l)('eti Sttb.wet to a IPs"
<'Xa<'tlltg overlm•adth serutiny :Ylon·ovl'l'. tlw fact re
mnin!ol that ~ Hl8 regulat<'~" a. f:'ltbstallttal speC'tru1n of

I

7J - Hi~9-0Pl::\JO .

BHOADHIC'K " OKLAilO\L\

15

t:(!llduct that is as ma1ufestly sub.wet to stat<' re~~;ulation
as the public peacr or cnminal trespass. Th1s much \\'aR
rstablished i11 (' m'ted Public Workers v. il-filthell, and
has been unheasitati11gly rraffinned today 111 Detter Carriers, ante. Fndrr thr decision in Letter CMriers, tlwrP
is no qu<>stion that ~ 818 is valid at least Insofar as It
forbids classified rmployees front . sol!cJtinl-{ contribu ~
tJOilS for partisan candidat<·s. political parties. or otlH'I'
partisa 11 politieal purposes ; becom1 Ill!, nwmlwrr:: of na
tJOili:ll. stat<'. or lo<·al eom1nittces of polJtH·al partH'S. Ol'
officNs or <·ommJtt<'<' Inembt•rs 111 partisan political club~ .
or candidates to any paid publie office; taking part 111 tlw
managellH'Ilt or affairs of any political party 's parW;a11
political eampaign, SC'rvlllg as dcl<'gat<'S or altemat<'fo; to
caucus<'s or <'Oilventions of polit1eal part1es; addressilllf
o1· taking a11 activr part Ill partisan pohtiC'al rallies or
11wetmgs; soliciting vot<'s or ass1sti1lg voters at th<' pull~
or helping lll a partisan pffort tu grt voters at the polls .
partwipati11g 111 the distributiOn of partlSall campaign
literature ; initiating or Circulating partisan llOilllnatinl!.
pNitions; or riding 111 carava11S for any polltwal party or
partisan political <'UIHilda l<'
Tlws<' proscriptiOns arc· tak<•n dm•<·tly from the <·OJI tested paragraphs of~ ~lH. till' Rules of the :-ltate P<'rSOIJ n<'l Board. and tlw authoritative opinions of the :-ltatr
A ttompy U<•neral. \Vi thout q uest1on . tlw cond lH't a p- 1~
jWJlantS have bf'Pil chal'g('d With fall s SqUarc-•ly \\'Ithlll f
tlwsP proscnptwn:s
Apprllants assrn that ~ Xl~ go<'s much farther than
thPs<' prohibitions. According to appcllants. tlH· statu tc 's prohibitwn s arc• not tied ttgh tly enough to part is an
polit1cal <·onduct and impermissibly r<'lcgat<' <'lllployces
to <'xprPssi ng their political VJ<'ws '' pnvately. " The :-\tat<·
Pt'rsonnrl Board. howc>ver. has construed ~ iHX's t•xp!Jcit
approval of " privatP " politwal <'Xpr<>sswn tu tncludP

il- ltJ:l9- (l l'lNIO?\
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virtually any cxpi'('ssioll 110t within the context of active
partisa11 political campaigning.'' anu the State 's Attorney
G(•neral, in plain t(•rms, ha~ interpreted ~ 818 as prohibiting "clearly partisan political activity'' only."'
~urely a court cannot be expected to ignore these authoritative proJwunceJH('IltS in determining tbe breadth
of a state ~tatut<'. Appellants further point to the
Board's interpretiv<' rulPs purporting to restrict such allegedly protPcted activities as the wearing of political
buttons or the use of bumper stickers. It may be that
such restrictions are in1permisible and that the ~ 818
may be susceptible- of som<· other improper application s.
But as prese11tly co11strued. v,:e do not believe that ~ 81~
must be discarded in loto because some persons' arguably
protected conduct may or may not be caught or chilled
by the statute. ~ectiOil 1-\18 is not substantially overbroad a1HI is not. therefore, unconstitutional Oll its facf\ .
ThP judgme11t of the District Court is affirmed .

It is su ordered.

'' Thr Board '., lllt<'rprrtn·c· r1n·ular
~on~.

pol1t ic·~il

(Rrr . :2:37):

to all ~uch pPrto thr prohibition that ~uch
p< ' tNJtJ~ 111:1~ · not tnkP :tl't i\'(• part 111 political managcm<•nt ur Ill
polt t 1en! <'am p:ugu~ "
'''Opinion of tit<• AttonH·_,. (:rll(•ntl, ~o . 6S-:351i. p. :2 ( 191iii)
Tltr Di~tt'll't ( 'omt ,;i milariY mtrrpr<'tf'd § 81/i a~ tntt•ndmg to pt•rmtt
puhltc Pxprr.,~IOII~ of political opul!on .. ~o long a~ t hl' Ptnplo~·<'<' doe'
not rhannrlln- acttYil\' toward~ part~ · ~urcr~~-" :nk F. Supp. ill .
/Hi Althonglt thr ('ourt\ t.nt<·rprctatton lei obv1ou~l~· not b1nding
on ,;tnt<' :tltthontJC'"· ."<'< ' Cnited State~; ,._ Tfnrty-,'ie ve ll fJfwtoornfih~;.
-!0:2 l'. S. :m:l. :-lf\9 ( 1911). a frdf'ral l'ollrt mt1"t <ktt'l'ffiiiH' wlwt a
~ tat<' ~tntut<· mf•:tn~ hf'i'<>rr it c·an .iudgl' II.-' fnc1:tl con,tittltlonallt:.
"Tiw nght. to

l'Xpn·~~

~tatr~

OJllltlon~ i~ rr~rrved

~oi· r: Tl11~ re~<·rvntion ~~ H~lh.it·c·t

.§n.pumt ~curl cf tltt ~nittb .§ta±t.s

~ht.sfringt~ ~. ~· ' 2tlpJ.1.;1
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

May 30, 1973

Re:

No. 71-1639 - Broadrick v. Oklahoma

Dear Byron:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

r)J/"V'

Mr. Justice White
Copies to the Conference

Dear Byron:

cc:

•.

.iu:vrttttt ~ourt of tqt ~nittb j;Pttts
~:tilrhtg!ott. ~. ~· :!ilgtJt~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN , JR.

June 1, 1973

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

RE: No. 71-1639 Broadrick v. Oklahoma
No. 72-634 U.S. Civil Service Commission
v. National Letter Carriers, etc.

I shall circulate dissents in these two cases in

due course.

W. J. B. Jr •

.,

'.'

.

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

June 4, 1973

Re: No. 71-1639 -

Broadrick v. Oklahoma

Dear Byron:
Please join me.

Mr. Justice White

cc:

The Conference

;§u:puntt ~onrl uf tqt 'Jltttittb ~ta:tts
Jfasfrhtght~ !B.

OJ.

zn.;;'1~

CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

June 6, 1973

Re: No. 71-1639 .. William M. Broadrick, et al v. State of
Oklahoma, et a1

Dear Byron:
Please join me in your fine opinion in the above case.
I will try to resist the temptation to add a hearty "Amen" in
concurrence.

Mr. Justice White

Copies to the Conference
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SUPREtvlE COUlU OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 71-1639

To: The
Mr.
Mr.
:Mr.
:Mr.
Mr.
""'f.!r.
Mr.

William M. Broadrick et al.,
Appellants,
y.

State of Oklahoma et al.

Chief Justice
Douglas
Justice Ste1·:art
,T'J.tru&pl\fftfifu from the United
Just$1t@ti~:Psllii~trict Court
JustftW:"Btbe:-m\it:Istern District
JustdXfe (J)b.~l}oma.
Justice Rehnquist
Just~ce

From: Brennan, J.
Circulated:
[June

, 1973]

Recirculated:

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting:
Whatever one's view of the desirability or constitutionality
of legislative efforts to restrict the political activities of
government employees, one must regard today's decision upholding
§ 818 of the Oklahoma Merit System of Personnel Administration

Act _1_/ as a wholly unjustified retreat from fundamental and
previously well-established First Amendment principles.

For

the purposes of this decision, the Court assumes--perhaps
even concedes--that the statute at issue here sweeps too
broadly, barring speech and conduct that are constitutionally
protected even under the standards announced in United Public
Workers v. Mitchell, 330

u.s.

75 (1947), and reiterated today

in United States Civil Service Commission v. National Association
of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, ante, p.

Nevertheless, the

Court rejects appellants' contention that the statute is

·~
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unconstitutional on its face, reasoning that "where
conduct and not merely speech is involved, . . . the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial
as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly
legitimate sweep.

It is our view that § 818 is not

substantially overbroad and that whatever overbreadth may
exist should be cured through case-by-case analysis of the fact
situations to which its sanctions, assertedly, may not be
applied."

Ante, at

That conclusion finds no support in

previous decisions of this Court, and it effectively overrules
our decision just tw·o Terms ago in Coates v. City of Cincinnati,
402 U.S. 611 (1971).

I remain convinced that Coates was

correctly decided, and I must therefore respectfully dissent.
As employees of the Corporation Commission of the State
of Oklahoma, a state agency, appellants are subject to the
provisions of the State's Merit Act.

That Act designates

certain state agencies, including the Corporation Commission,
I

which are barred from dismissing or suspending classified
employees for political reasons.

At the same time, the Act

authorizes the State Personnel Board to dismiss or suspend any

..

,.

'
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classified employee who enga ges in certain· prohibited political
activity.

Although specifically protecting an employee's right

"as a citizen privately to express his opinion and to cast
his vote," the Act bars (1) fund-raising for any political
purpose; (2) membership in any national, state, or local
committee of a political party or a political club; (3)
candidacy for any public office; and (4) participation in the
"management or affairs of any political party or in any ·
political campaign."
As a result of appellants' alleged participation in the
1970 re-election campaign of Corporation Commissioner Ray

c.

Jones, the State Personnel Board formally charged appellants
with violations of the Act.
action under 42

u.s.c.

Appellants then

~rought

this

§ 1983 before a three-judge Federal

District Court in the Western District of Oklahoma, seeking
an injunction against enforcement of the Act,

The District

Court rejected appellants' contentions that the Act is
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, arid the Court today
affirms that determination.
Appellants First Amendment claims are, of course, similar
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to the vagueness and overbreadth contentions rejected by the
Court today in upholding§ 9(a) of the Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 7324(a)(2).

See National Association of Letter Carriers,

ante, p. ___ .

But that decision, whether or not correct, is

by no means controlling on the questions now before us.
Certain fundamental differences between the Hatch Act and
the Oklahoma Herit Act should, at the outset, be made clear.
Section 9(a) of the Hatch Act provides that a federal
government employee may not "(1) use his official authority
or influence for the purpose of interfering . with or affecting
the result of an election; or (2) take an active part in
political management or in political campaigns."

Although

recognizing that the meaning of the Act's critical phrase,
"an active part in political management or in political
campaigns," is hardly free from ambiguity, the Court concluded
that the term could be defined by reference to a complex
network of Civil Service Commission regulations developed over
many years and comprehens,i vely restated in 1970.
5 C.F.R. Part 733.

See

Those regulations make clear that among the

I

rights retained by a federal employee, notwithstanding the
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arguably contrary language of the statute, are the rights to
"[e]xpress his opinion as an individual privately and
publicly on political subjects and candidates;" to "[d]isplay
a political picture, sticker, badge, or button;" to "[b]e
a member of a political party or other political organization
; " and to "[m]ake a financial contribution to a
political party or organization."

5 C.F.R. § 733.111.

By contrast, the critical phrase of the Oklahoma ~ct-
no employee shall "take part in the management or affairs
of any political party or in any political campaign"-is left almost 'vholly undefined.

\.Vhile the Act does

specifically declare that employees have the right to
express their views "in private," it nowhere defines the
terms "take part" or "management" or "affairs."

The

reservation of the right to express one's views in private
could, moreover, be thought to mean that any public expression
of views is forbidden.

Of course, the Oklahoma Act can, like

its federal counterpart, be viewed in conjunction with the
applicable administrative regulations.

But in marked contrast

with the elaborate set of regulations purporting to define the
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prohibitions of the Hatch Act, the pertinent regulations of
the State Personnel Board are a scant five rules that shed
no light at all on the intended reach of the statute.

Two

of those rules merely recite the language of the Act. __2_/
A third offers no more specific guidance than the general
exhortation that a classified employee shall "pursue the common
good, and, not only be impartial, but so act as neither to
endanger his impartiality nor to give occasion for distrust of
his impartiality." __3_/

A fourth provides that a classified

employee must resign his position "prior to filing as a
candidate for public office, seeking or accepting nomination
for election or appointment as an official of a political
party"--again, merely tracking the language of the Act. _!]_/
The fifth, far from clarifying or limiting the scope of the
Act, provides the major thrust to appellants' overbreadth
contention.

The rule declares that "[a]n employee in the

classified service may not wear a political padge, button,
or similar partisan emblem, nor may such employee display a
partisan political sticker or sign on an automobile operated
by him or under his control." _2_/

·, .

Even the Court concedes
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that a ban on the wearing of buttons or the display of
bumper stickers may be "impermissible."

Ante, at

It is possible, .of course, that the inherent ambiguity
of the Oklahoma statute might be cured by judicial construction
of its terms.

But the Oklahoma Supreme Court has never

attempted to construe the Act or narrow its apparent reach.
Plainly, this Court cannot undertake that task.

Gooding v,

Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972); United States v. Thirty-Seven
Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971).
that the Act,

MM8R

~

I must assume, therefore,

subject to whatever gloss is provided by

_:]__/
the

~dministrative

regulations, is capable of applications

that would prohibit speech and conduct clearly protected by
the First Amendment,

Even on the assumption that the statute's

regulatory aim is permissible, the manner in which state power
is exercised is one that unduly infringes protected freedoms.
Shelton v. Tucker,
Connecticut, 310

36~

u:s.

U.S. 479, 489 (1960); Cantwell v.
296, 304 (1940),

The State has failed,

in other words, to provide the necessary "sensitive tools" to
carry out the "Sf3paration of legitimate from illegitimate speech."
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Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958).

See NAACP v.

Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
Although the Court does not expressly hold that the
statute is vague and overbroad, it does assume not only that
the ban on the wearing of badges and buttons may be "impermissible,"
but also that the Act "may be susceptible of some other
improper applications."

Ante, at __ .

Under principles that

I had thought established beyond dispute, that assumption
requires a finding that the statute is unconstitutional on its
1

face.

Ordinarily, "one to whom application of a statute is

constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on
the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying
to other persons or other situations in which its application
might be· unconstitutional."
17, 21

(1960).~ And

United States v. Raines, 362 U.S.

it is conceded, it would seem, that the

State could prohibit appellants' conduct without infringing
the guarantees of the First Amendment.

Nevertheless, we have

repeatedly recognized that "the transcendent value to
all society of constitutionally protected expression
is deemed to justify allowing 'attacks on

·,

,.......

.

:•

'•
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overly lJroad stat utes with no requirement that ·the person
making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not
he regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow
specificity.'" Gooding v. Wilson, supra, at 521,

gxgiH~

.!1We

Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).

quoting

have

adhered to that view because the guarantees of the First
Amendment are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely
precious in our society.

The threat of sanctions may deter

their exercise almost as potently as the. actual application

u.s.

of sanctions.

Cf. Smith v. California, [361

154 (1959)]."

NAACP v. Button, supra, at 432-433.

147,

151-

The

mere .existence of a statute that sweeps too broadly in areas
protected by the First Amendment "results in a continuous
and pervasive restraint on all freedom of discus sion that
might reasonably be regarded as within its purview.

...

Where regulations of the liberty of free discussion are
concerned, there are S.Pecial reasons for observing the rule
that it is the statute, and not the accusation of the evidence
under it, which prescribes the limits of permissible conduct
and warns against transgression."
4

Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
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U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940).

See Note, The First Amendment

Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 Harv. L. Rev, 844, 853-854 (1970),
Although the Court declines to hold the Oklahoma Act
unconstitutional on its face, it does expressly recognize
that overbreadth review is a necessary means of preventing
a "chilling effect" on protected expression.

Nevertheless,

the Court reasons that the function of the doctrine "attenuates
as the behavior the State is forbidden to sanction moves from
'pure speech' towards conduct and that conduct--even if
expressive--falls within the scope of otherwise valid
criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in
maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally
unprotected conduct,"

Ante, at

Where conduct is involved,

a statute's overbreadth must henceforth be "substantial"
before the statute can properly be found invalid on its face.
I cannot accept the validity of that analysis,

In the

first place, the Court makes no effort to define what. it
means by "substantial overbreadth."

We have never held that

a statute should be held invalid on its face merely because it is
possible to conceive of a single impermissible application, and in

..
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,•

that sense a requirement of substantial overbreadth is already
implicit in the doctrine.

Cf. Notte, The First Amendment Over-

breadth Doctrine, supra, at :858-860, 918.

Whether the Court

means to require some different or greater showing of substantiality
is left obscure by today's opinion, in large part because
the Court makes no effort to explain why ·the overbreadth
of the Oklahoma Act, while real, is somehow not quite
substantial.

No more guidance is provided than the Court's

conclus0ry assertion that appellants' showing here falls
belO\v the line.
More fundamentally, the Court offers no rationale to
its conclusion that, for purposes of overbreadth

expl~in

analysis, deterrence of conduct should be viewed differently
from deterrence of speech, even where both are equally
protected by the First Amendment.

Indeed, in the case before

us it is hard to knO\v whether the protected activity falling
within the Act should .be considered speech or conduct.

In any

case, the conclusion that a distinction should be drawn was
the premise of MR. JUSTICE WHITE's dissenting opinion in
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 620-621 (1971),

.

'

and that conclusion--although squarely rejected in Coates--has
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now been adopted by the Court.
At issue in Coates was a city ordinance making it an
offense for "three or more persons to assemble . . • on any
of the sidewalks . . .. and there conduct themselves in a
manner annoying to persons passing by •

..."

There can

be no doubt that the ordinance was held unconsti.tutinnal
on its face, and not merely unconstitutional as applied to
particular, protected conduct.

For the Court expressly noted

that the ordinance was "aimed directly
by the Constitution.

a~

activity protected

We need not lament that we do not have

before us the details of the conduct found to be annoying.

It

is the ordinance on its face that sets the standard of donduct
and warns against transgression.

The details of the offense

could no more serve to validate this ordinance than could the
details of an offense charged under an ordinance suspending
unconditionally the right of assembly and free speech."
U.S., at 616.

402

In dissent, MR. JUSTICE WHITE maintained that

since the ordinance prohibited persons from "assembling and
'conduct[ing]' themselves in a manner annoying to other persons,"
he would "deal with the Cincinnati ordinance as we would

·,

..

.~.

.'

~
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with the ordinary criminal statute.

The ordinance clearly

reaches certain conduct but may be illegally vague with respect
to other conduct.

The statute is not infirm on its face and

since we have no information on this record as to what conduct
was charged against these defendants, we are in no position to
judge the statute as applied.

That the ordinance may confer

wide discretion in a wide range of circumstances is irrelevant
when we may be dealing with conduct at its core,"
at 620-621.
1

402 U.S.,

Thus, Coates stood, until today, for the proposition

that where a statute is "unconstitutionally broad because it
authorizes the punishment of constitutionally protected conduct,"
402 U.S., at 614, it must be held invalid on its face whether
or not the person raising the challenge could have been

.1V

prosecuted under a properly narrowed statute.

The Court

makes no attempt to distinguish Coates, implicitly conceding
that the decision has been overruled.
At this stage, it is obviously difficult to estimate the
probable impact of tod.ay's decision.

If the requirement of

"substantial" overbreadth is construed to mean only that
facial review is inappropriate where the likelihood of an
impermi~sib~e

application of the statute i s too small to generate
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a "chilling effect" on protected speech or conduct, then the
impact is likely to be small.

On the other hand, if today's

decision necessitates the drawing of

artific~al

distinctions

between protected speech and protected conduct, and if the
"chill" on protected conduct is rarely, if ever, found
sufficient to require the facial invalidation of an overbroad
statute, then the effect could be very grave indeed.

In

my view, the principles set forth in Coates v. City of Cincinnati
are essential to the preservation and en.forcement of the
First Amendment guarantees.

Since no subsequent development

has persuaded me that the principles are ill-founded or that
Coates was incorrectly decided, I would reverse the judgment
of the District Court on the strength of that decision,and
hold the Oklahoma l'1erit Act unconstitutional on its face.

FOOTNOTES

!/

Okla. Stat. Ann. § 818 provides in

~ertinent

part:

"No employee in the classified service, and no member of
the Personnel Board shall, directly or indirectly, solicit,
receive, or in any manner be concerned in soliciting or
receiving any assessment, subscription or contribution
f~r

any political organization, candidacy or other

political purpose; and no state officer or state employee
in the unclassified service shall solicit or receive
any such assessment, subscription

OJ;

contribution from

an employee in the classified service.
"No employee in the classified service shall be a member
of any national, state or local committee of a political
par~y,

or an officer or member of a committee of a partisan

political club, or a candidate for nomination or election
to any paid public office, or shall take part in the
management or affairs of any political party or in any
political campaign, except to exercise his rights as a
citizen privately to express his opinion and to cast
his vote,"

FN-2

£/Oklahoma State Personne l Board Rule 1630 (1971)1
"No employee in the classified service, and no
member of the Personnel Board shall, directly or
indirectly, . solicit, receive, or in any manner be
concerned in soliciting or receiving any assessment,
subscription or contribution for any political
organization, candidacy or other political purpose;
and no state officer or state employee in the
unclassified service shall solicit or receive any
such assessment, subscription or contribution from
an employee in the classified service."
Rule 1640 provides:
"No employee in the classified service shall be a
member of any national, state or local committee of
a political party, or an officer or member of a
committee of a partisan political club or a candidate
for

nominati~n

or election to any paid public office,

or shall 'take part in the management or affairs of any
political party or in any political campaign, except to
exercise his right as a citizen privately to express

FN-3

his opinion and to cast his vote."
Compare note 1 supra.

d_l Rule 1625 provides:
"Every classified employee shall fulfill to the
best of his ability the duties of the office of
position conferred upon him and shall prove
himself in his behavior, inside and outside, the worth
of the esteem which his office - or position requires.
In his official activities the classified employee
shall pursue the common good, and, not only be impartial,
but ao act as neither to endanger his impartiality
nor to g ive occasion for distrust of his impartiality.
"A classified employee shall not engage·in any
employment, activity or enterprise which has been
determined to be inconsistent, incompatible, or in
conflict w·itJ:l his euties as a classified employee or
with the duties, functions or responsibilities of the
Appointing Authority by which he is employed.
"Each Appointing Authority shall detennine and prescribe
those activities which, for employees under its juris-

..,

FN-4

diction, will be considered inconsist·e nt, incompatible
or in conflict with their duties as classified
employees.

In making this determination the Appointing

Authority shall give consideration to employment,
activity or enterprise wfuich: (a) involves the use
for private gain or advantage df state time, facilities,
equipment and supplies; or, the badge, uniform,
prestige or influence of one's state office of employment, or (b) involves receipt pr acceptance by the
classified employee of any money or other consideration
from

anyon~

other than the State, for the performance

of an,act which the classified employee would be
required or expected to render in the regular course
or hours of his state employment or as a part of his
duties as a state classified

emplo~ee,

or (c) involves

the performance of an act in other than his capacity as
a state classified employee which act may later be
subject d1rectly or indirectly to the control, inspection,
review, audit or enforcement by such classified
employee or the agency by which he is employed.
"Each classified employee shall during his hours

FN-5

of duty and subject to such other laws, rules and
regulations as pertain thereto, devote his full time,
attention and efforts to his office or employment."

~/

Rule 1209,2 provides:
"Any classified employee shall resign his position
prior to filing as a candidate for public office,
seeking or accepting nomination for election or
appointment as an official of a political party,
partisan political club or organization or serving
as a member of a committee of any such group or
organization."

21

Rule 1641 provides:
"An employee of the classified service may not wear a
political badge, button, or similar partisan emblem,
nor may

such . emplo~ee

display a partisan political

sticker or sign on an automobile operated by him or
under his conrrol.Continued use or display . of such

t

•

FN-6

political material shall be deeme d willful intent
to violate the provisions of 74 O.S. 1961 § 818
relating to prohibited political activities of classified State employees and shall subject such employee
m~nx

.·

to dismissal pursuant to said statute."

FN

7

§_/- See also Niemotko v. f'1aryland, 340 U.S. 268, 285 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result in Kunz v. New York,
340 U.S. 290 (1951)): "It is not for this Court to formulate

with particularity the terms of a permit system which would
satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment."

11 In addition to the regulations promulgated by the State
Personnel Board, the Court places some reliance on an interpretive
circular issued by the Board and on certain opinions issued
by the State Attorney General.

Even assuming that these

constructions should properly be considered in gauging the
reach of the Act, they offer little real guidance to the
meaning of the terms.

The circular, for example, states that

"The right to express political opinions is reserved to all such
persons.

Note: This reservation is subject to the prohibition

that such persons may not take active part in political
management or in political campaigns."
The second half of

~hat

provision of the Act.

statement merely restates the
The first ha l f can hardly be said to

convey any fixed meaning.
•

See note 14 ante.

In fact, given the statement in the

4

Act that the right to make a private expression of political

·.:

FN 8

views is protected, an employee might reaGonably interpret the
circular to mean that "The right to express political opinions
is reserved to all such persons, provided that such expression
is not made in public,"

Similarly, the Court makes reference

to an Opinion of the Attorney General holding, "in plain
tenns," ante, at

, that the Act applies only to "clearly

partisan activity."

I am at a loss to see how these

statements offer any clarification of the provisions of the
Act.

~/

Raines concerned a prosecution under § 131 of the Civil

Rights Act of 1957, charging that the defendants, in their
· capacity. as State officials, had discriminated against blacks
who desired to register to vote.

The defendants' conduct

plainly fell within the permissible reach of the statute.
But more importantly, it was not even suggested that the
statute might

"~

conceiva~ly~used

First Amendment rights.

to punish the exercise of

While stating the general rule that

a defendant normally may not assert the constitutional rights
of a person not a party, Raines did specifically recognize

.

~

FN

9

that the rule is suspended in cases where its application
would "itself have have an inhibitory effect on freedom of
speech."

362 U.S., at 22.

Cf. United States v. National

Dairy Corp. ,·372 U.S. 29 (1963);

Yazoo~ ~R.R.

v. Jackson

Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217 (1912).

2./

See also Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Aptheker

v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Terminiello v.
City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949),

lQ/

The Court has applied overbreadth review to many other

statu:tes that assertedly had a "chilling effect" on protected
conduct, · rather than on "pure speecl:tn."

See·,..

~·,

United States

v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Aptheker v. Secretary of State,
supra; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940),

In none of

these cases, or others involving conduct rather than speech,
did the Court suggest that a defendant would lack standing to
raise the overbreadth claim if his conduct could be proscribed
by a narrowly drawn statute.
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